자료유형 | E-Book |
---|---|
개인저자 | McClellan, Andrew Alan. |
단체저자명 | New York University. Economics. |
서명/저자사항 | Essays in Microeconomics. |
발행사항 | [S.l.] : New York University., 2018 |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 |
형태사항 | 264 p. |
소장본 주기 | School code: 0146. |
ISBN | 9780438170698 |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
Advisers: Debraj Ray |
요약 | This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of them containing an essay that is related to mechanism design, either through the design of information policies or in dynamic settings. |
요약 | The first chapter, "Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms," investigates how to design approval rules incentivize an agent to perform experimentation in a dynamic setting about the quality of a project. We study the design of approval rules (w |
요약 | The second chapter, "Dynamic Project Standards with Adverse Selection," looks at how to elicit information about a project whose profitability changes over time. We study a principal-agent relationship in which the agent has private information |
요약 | Finally, in the third chapter, "Knowing Your Opponent: Auction Design with Asymmetries," I study how much information to reveal about bidders in an auction. A famous result in the auction literature is that in a common-value auction, the auction |
일반주제명 | Economic theory. |
언어 | 영어 |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International79-12A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
대출바로가기 | http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14997027 |
인쇄
No. | 등록번호 | 청구기호 | 소장처 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 | 매체정보 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | WE00024525 | DP 330 | 가야대학교/전자책서버(컴퓨터서버)/ | 대출불가(별치) |