LDR | | 00000nmm u2200205 4500 |
001 | | 000000330198 |
005 | | 20241025143536 |
008 | | 181129s2018 ||| | | | eng d |
020 | |
▼a 9780438170698 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10749111 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)nyu:13192 |
040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 248032 |
049 | 1 |
▼f DP |
082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
100 | 1 |
▼a McClellan, Andrew Alan. |
245 | 10 |
▼a Essays in Microeconomics. |
260 | |
▼a [S.l.] :
▼b New York University.,
▼c 2018 |
260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor :
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018 |
300 | |
▼a 264 p. |
500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A. |
500 | |
▼a Advisers: Debraj Ray |
502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018. |
520 | |
▼a This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of them containing an essay that is related to mechanism design, either through the design of information policies or in dynamic settings. |
520 | |
▼a The first chapter, "Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms," investigates how to design approval rules incentivize an agent to perform experimentation in a dynamic setting about the quality of a project. We study the design of approval rules (w |
520 | |
▼a The second chapter, "Dynamic Project Standards with Adverse Selection," looks at how to elicit information about a project whose profitability changes over time. We study a principal-agent relationship in which the agent has private information |
520 | |
▼a Finally, in the third chapter, "Knowing Your Opponent: Auction Design with Asymmetries," I study how much information to reveal about bidders in an auction. A famous result in the auction literature is that in a common-value auction, the auction |
590 | |
▼a School code: 0146. |
650 | 4 |
▼a Economic theory. |
690 | |
▼a 0511 |
710 | 20 |
▼a New York University.
▼b Economics. |
773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 79-12A(E). |
773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
790 | |
▼a 0146 |
791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
792 | |
▼a 2018 |
793 | |
▼a English |
856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14997027
▼n KERIS |
980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
990 | |
▼a 관리자
▼b 관리자 |