MARC보기
LDR00000nmm u2200205 4500
001000000330198
00520241025143536
008181129s2018 ||| | | | eng d
020 ▼a 9780438170698
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10749111
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)nyu:13192
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 248032
0491 ▼f DP
0820 ▼a 330
1001 ▼a McClellan, Andrew Alan.
24510 ▼a Essays in Microeconomics.
260 ▼a [S.l.] : ▼b New York University., ▼c 2018
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor : ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2018
300 ▼a 264 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
500 ▼a Advisers: Debraj Ray
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018.
520 ▼a This dissertation consists of three chapters, each of them containing an essay that is related to mechanism design, either through the design of information policies or in dynamic settings.
520 ▼a The first chapter, "Experimentation and Approval Mechanisms," investigates how to design approval rules incentivize an agent to perform experimentation in a dynamic setting about the quality of a project. We study the design of approval rules (w
520 ▼a The second chapter, "Dynamic Project Standards with Adverse Selection," looks at how to elicit information about a project whose profitability changes over time. We study a principal-agent relationship in which the agent has private information
520 ▼a Finally, in the third chapter, "Knowing Your Opponent: Auction Design with Asymmetries," I study how much information to reveal about bidders in an auction. A famous result in the auction literature is that in a common-value auction, the auction
590 ▼a School code: 0146.
650 4 ▼a Economic theory.
690 ▼a 0511
71020 ▼a New York University. ▼b Economics.
7730 ▼t Dissertation Abstracts International ▼g 79-12A(E).
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0146
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2018
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14997027 ▼n KERIS
980 ▼a 201812 ▼f 2019
990 ▼a 관리자 ▼b 관리자