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020 ▼a 9780438381582
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10188510
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)uiowa:14366
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 248032
0820 ▼a 121
1001 ▼a Stoutenburg, Gregory Douglas.
24510 ▼a Knowledge, Infallibility, and Skepticism.
260 ▼a [S.l.] : ▼b The University of Iowa., ▼c 2016
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor : ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2016
300 ▼a 264 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02(E), Section: A.
500 ▼a Adviser: Richard A. Fumerton.
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2016.
520 ▼a I argue that to know that a proposition is true one must have justification for being certain that the proposition is true. That is, one must have infallible epistemic justification for believing the proposition. It is widely accepted among epis
520 ▼a My dissertation has three main components: a metaphilosophical position, an epistemological position, and an error theory. First, the metaphilosophical position. One very important part of philosophy is the analysis of our ordinary concepts. Ana
520 ▼a Second, the epistemological position. I argue that the unacceptability of sentences of the form "S knows that p but it is possible for S that not-p" is best explained by the hypothesis that our concept of knowledge requires having justification
520 ▼a Third, the error theory. Of course, we rarely have direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the propositions we believe. So, our knowledge attributions are generally false. Yet, they are overwhelmingly natural to make. I argu
590 ▼a School code: 0096.
650 4 ▼a Epistemology.
650 4 ▼a Philosophy.
690 ▼a 0393
690 ▼a 0422
71020 ▼a The University of Iowa. ▼b Philosophy.
7730 ▼t Dissertation Abstracts International ▼g 80-02A(E).
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0096
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2016
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14996468 ▼n KERIS
980 ▼a 201812 ▼f 2019
990 ▼a 관리자