| LDR | | 02535nmm uu200421 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000334200 |
| 005 | | 20240805175328 |
| 008 | | 181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9780438075375 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10828798 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)ucla:16956 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 248032 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 320 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Ananyev, Maxim. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Political Economy of Offshore Finance. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.] :
▼b University of California, Los Angeles.,
▼c 2018 |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor :
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018 |
| 300 | |
▼a 156 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Adviser: Daniel S. Treisman. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2018. |
| 520 | |
▼a This dissertation analyzes the patterns of business elites' offshore usage and its impact on domestic politics. I advance two theoretical claims. First, the availability of offshore zones makes autocracies stronger by facilitating patron-client |
| 520 | |
▼a After providing some historical and economic background on the evolution of tax havens, I present a simple theory of patron-client exchange in autocracies that rely on a tax haven as a commitment device for a ruler. I argue that the availability |
| 520 | |
▼a Then, I offer cross-national evidence that speaks to some of my theory's implications. In particular, I use previously untapped country-level data on the size of offshore holdings to test if offshore utilization prevents democratization. I find |
| 520 | |
▼a Then, I move on to explore another important implication of my theory: an exogenous marginal decrease in the safety of offshore assets should trigger an increase in the spoils the ruler shares with the elite. I use recent rounds of international |
| 520 | |
▼a I also discuss corporate tax avoidance through tax havens. In particular, I ask why some firms avoid local taxes by establishing affiliates in tax havens while others do not. I argue that firms that are more vulnerable to political risk are less |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0031. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Political science. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0615 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a University of California, Los Angeles.
▼b Political Science 0699. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 79-11A(E). |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0031 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2018 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14999218
▼n KERIS |
| 980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
| 990 | |
▼a 관리자 |