| LDR | | 01980nmm uu200397 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000333685 |
| 005 | | 20240805173517 |
| 008 | | 181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9780438082571 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10830030 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)wisc:15431 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 248032 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Loginov, George. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Essays on Population Games. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.] :
▼b The University of Wisconsin - Madison.,
▼c 2018 |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor :
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018 |
| 300 | |
▼a 90 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Adviser: William H. Sandholm. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2018. |
| 520 | |
▼a The first chapter presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates ho |
| 520 | |
▼a The second chapter generalizes the model of Kranton (1996), who demonstrated that in optimal monomorphic equilibria i) cooperative behavior can be supported by strategies involving no more than two levels of cooperation, with the lower level emp |
| 520 | |
▼a The third chapter introduces an imitative evolutionary dynamic with minimal information requirements. Agents in a large population are matched to play a symmetric game. An agent who receives a revision opportunity observes one opponent from the |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0262. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Economics. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0501 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a The University of Wisconsin - Madison.
▼b Economics. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 79-11A(E). |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0262 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2018 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14999383
▼n KERIS |
| 980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
| 990 | |
▼a 관리자 |