| LDR | | 01988nmm uu200397 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000333370 |
| 005 | | 20240805172912 |
| 008 | | 181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d |
| 020 | |
▼a 9780438324787 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10816708 |
| 035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)berkeley:17870 |
| 040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 248032 |
| 082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Szucs, Ferenc. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Essays on Corruption and Political Favoritism. |
| 260 | |
▼a [S.l.] :
▼b University of California, Berkeley.,
▼c 2018 |
| 260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor :
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018 |
| 300 | |
▼a 91 p. |
| 500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A. |
| 500 | |
▼a Adviser: Frederico Finan. |
| 502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2018. |
| 520 | |
▼a Corruption and political favoritism are considered major impediments to economic development. Although there is a growing consensus about the adverse efficiency consequences of corruption we still have a limited understanding of how corruption i |
| 520 | |
▼a In the first chapter, I investigate the determinants and consequences of increasing a buyer's discretion in public procurement. I study the role of discretion in the context of a Hungarian policy reform which removed the obligation of using an o |
| 520 | |
▼a Moreover, case studies suggest that in addition to rent extraction corruption provides opportunities to buy political support in weakly institutionalized democracies (e.g. McMillan and Zoido (2004)). Consequently, detrimental effects of politica |
| 590 | |
▼a School code: 0028. |
| 650 | 4 |
▼a Economics. |
| 690 | |
▼a 0501 |
| 710 | 20 |
▼a University of California, Berkeley.
▼b Economics. |
| 773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 80-01A(E). |
| 773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
| 790 | |
▼a 0028 |
| 791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
| 792 | |
▼a 2018 |
| 793 | |
▼a English |
| 856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14998281
▼n KERIS |
| 980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
| 990 | |
▼a 관리자 |