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020 ▼a 9780438116696
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10816213
035 ▼a (MiAaPQ)northwestern:14128
040 ▼a MiAaPQ ▼c MiAaPQ ▼d 248032
0820 ▼a 330
1001 ▼a Shopp, Colin.
24510 ▼a Endogenous Information Acquisition: Essays in Applied Game Theory.
260 ▼a [S.l.] : ▼b Northwestern University., ▼c 2018
260 1 ▼a Ann Arbor : ▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ▼c 2018
300 ▼a 105 p.
500 ▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
500 ▼a Adviser: Daniel Barron.
5021 ▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2018.
520 ▼a This dissertation endogenizes information acquisition in two-player games across three different settings. The first chapter explores when moral hazard in a principal-agent contract can lead to pareto improvements when it is preceeded by informa
520 ▼a In Chapter 1, I consider an agent who designs an experiment that reveals information about a state to a principal. The principal subsequently decides whether or not to implement a project. If she does, then she offers a limited-liability contrac
520 ▼a In Chapter 2, I apply the main result in Persico (2000), that decision-makers acquire more information when their payoffs are more risk-sensitive, to a duopoly model of Bertrand competition with uncertain demand following Vives (1984) in order t
520 ▼a In Chapter 3, I extend a simple model of debt between a liquidity-constrained entrepreneur and an investor to allow one of the players, according to the governance structure, to choose either risky or safe production at time 1. Risky production
590 ▼a School code: 0163.
650 4 ▼a Economic theory.
650 4 ▼a Economics.
690 ▼a 0511
690 ▼a 0501
71020 ▼a Northwestern University. ▼b Managerial Economics and Strategy.
7730 ▼t Dissertation Abstracts International ▼g 79-11A(E).
773 ▼t Dissertation Abstract International
790 ▼a 0163
791 ▼a Ph.D.
792 ▼a 2018
793 ▼a English
85640 ▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14998229 ▼n KERIS
980 ▼a 201812 ▼f 2019
990 ▼a 관리자