LDR | | 00000nmm u2200205 4500 |
001 | | 000000331946 |
005 | | 20241122131541 |
008 | | 181129s2018 ||| | | | eng d |
020 | |
▼a 9780438010895 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10826256 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)ucla:16827 |
040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 248032 |
049 | 1 |
▼f DP |
082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
100 | 1 |
▼a Lu, Zhuoran. |
245 | 10 |
▼a Essays on Contract Theory and Industrial Organization. |
260 | |
▼a [S.l.] :
▼b University of California, Los Angeles.,
▼c 2018 |
260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor :
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018 |
300 | |
▼a 150 p. |
500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-10(E), Section: A. |
500 | |
▼a Advisers: Simon Adrian Board |
502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Los Angeles, 2018. |
520 | |
▼a This dissertation consists of three essays on contract theory and industrial organization. |
520 | |
▼a The first chapter studies a signaling model in which a strategic player determines the cost structure of signaling. A principal chooses a price schedule for a product, and an agent with a hidden type chooses how much to purchase as a signal to t |
520 | |
▼a The second chapter studies nonlinear pricing for horizontally differentiated products that provide signaling values to consumers with private information, who choose how much to purchase as a signal to the receivers. I characterize the optimal s |
520 | |
▼a The third chapter analyzes a principal-agent model to study how the architecture of peer monitoring affects the optimal sequence for teamwork. The agents work on a joint project, each responsible for an individual task. The principal determines |
590 | |
▼a School code: 0031. |
650 | 4 |
▼a Economic theory. |
690 | |
▼a 0511 |
710 | 20 |
▼a University of California, Los Angeles.
▼b Economics. |
773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 79-10A(E). |
773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
790 | |
▼a 0031 |
791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
792 | |
▼a 2018 |
793 | |
▼a English |
856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14998863
▼n KERIS |
980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
990 | |
▼a 관리자
▼b 관리자 |