LDR | | 02042nmm uu200397 4500 |
001 | | 000000331064 |
005 | | 20240805163342 |
008 | | 181129s2018 |||||||||||||||||c||eng d |
020 | |
▼a 9780438348547 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10837164 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)unc:17967 |
040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 248032 |
082 | 0 |
▼a 330 |
100 | 1 |
▼a Winston, Aisling. |
245 | 10 |
▼a Income Distribution in Intellectual Property Rights Protection. |
260 | |
▼a [S.l.] :
▼b The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.,
▼c 2018 |
260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor :
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018 |
300 | |
▼a 116 p. |
500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A. |
500 | |
▼a Adviser: Gary Biglaiser. |
502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2018. |
520 | |
▼a This paper proposes a general model of the government's choice of intellectual property rights protection given the structure of the import market and the distribution of consumers' incomes. The model shows that the optimal level of protection |
520 | |
▼a The model is then extended to include local governments in trying to explain the divergence between the formal level of protection and the reality of protection in different localities. Localities, in response to their constituents and their pr |
520 | |
▼a Finally, the models are complemented by a country study of Jordan which examines more closely the effect of specific institutional structures in understanding one government's choice of protection. The pharmaceutical industry in Jordan provides |
590 | |
▼a School code: 0153. |
650 | 4 |
▼a Economics. |
690 | |
▼a 0501 |
710 | 20 |
▼a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
▼b Economics. |
773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 80-01A(E). |
773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
790 | |
▼a 0153 |
791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
792 | |
▼a 2018 |
793 | |
▼a English |
856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14999544
▼n KERIS |
980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
990 | |
▼a 관리자 |