LDR | | 00000nmm u2200205 4500 |
001 | | 000000330513 |
005 | | 20241101095119 |
008 | | 181129s2018 ||| | | | eng d |
020 | |
▼a 9780438371897 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)AAI10846017 |
035 | |
▼a (MiAaPQ)uchicago:14533 |
040 | |
▼a MiAaPQ
▼c MiAaPQ
▼d 248032 |
049 | 1 |
▼f DP |
082 | 0 |
▼a 100 |
100 | 1 |
▼a O'Connell, Rory Russell Peter Arthur. |
245 | 14 |
▼a The Efficacy of the Good. |
260 | |
▼a [S.l.] :
▼b The University of Chicago.,
▼c 2018 |
260 | 1 |
▼a Ann Arbor :
▼b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses,
▼c 2018 |
300 | |
▼a 234 p. |
500 | |
▼a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-01(E), Section: A. |
500 | |
▼a Adviser: Candace Vogler. |
502 | 1 |
▼a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2018. |
520 | |
▼a This dissertation articulates a conception of practical thought as genuinely productive. Its core thesis is that practical reason is a sui generis form of causal capacity: one whose efficacy is intrinsically rational, or equivalently, one whose |
520 | |
▼a In the first chapter I consider the prospects for an account of genuinely productive reason through engagement with the two pioneers of 20th Century philosophy of action: Elizabeth Anscombe and Donald Davidson. I argue that Davidson was correct |
520 | |
▼a In Chapter Two I begin to explicate the idea that intentional action is the exercise of a causal capacity. I argue, contra many contemporary accounts, that agent's exercises of their causal capacities, i.e., their actions, are identical to the c |
520 | |
▼a In Chapter Three I investigate the specifically rational causality of practical reason. I argue against recent attempts to explicate the rational causality of intentional action that identify practical judgments with intentional actions, on the |
520 | |
▼a In Chapter Four I explain how intentional movements can themselves be acts of practical reason. I argue that Intentional movements are the most basic form of rationality distinctive of practical reason, for in movement something inherently gener |
520 | |
▼a In Chapter Five, I show that the distinctive form of practical reason described in the preceding chapters demands that agents, in successful instrumental reasoning, recognize their ends as actually good. What sets the standard for instrumental r |
590 | |
▼a School code: 0330. |
650 | 4 |
▼a Philosophy. |
690 | |
▼a 0422 |
710 | 20 |
▼a The University of Chicago.
▼b Philosophy. |
773 | 0 |
▼t Dissertation Abstracts International
▼g 80-01A(E). |
773 | |
▼t Dissertation Abstract International |
790 | |
▼a 0330 |
791 | |
▼a Ph.D. |
792 | |
▼a 2018 |
793 | |
▼a English |
856 | 40 |
▼u http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T15000105
▼n KERIS |
980 | |
▼a 201812
▼f 2019 |
990 | |
▼a 관리자
▼b 관리자 |