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020 ▼a 9780192697318 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼a 0192697315 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼z 0192870211
020 ▼z 9780192870216
035 ▼a 3424199 ▼b (N$T)
035 ▼a (OCoLC)1349671926
040 ▼a N$T ▼b eng ▼e rda ▼e pn ▼c N$T ▼d N$T ▼d UKAHL ▼d STBDS ▼d OCLCQ ▼d UPM ▼d TFW ▼d OCLCQ ▼d OCLCO ▼d IUL ▼d 248032
049 ▼a MAIN
050 4 ▼a B105.R4
050 4 ▼a B832 ▼b .B733 2022
08204 ▼a 193 ▼2 23
1001 ▼a Brandom, Robert, ▼e author.
24510 ▼a Pragmatism and idealism : ▼b Rorty and Hegel on representation and reality / ▼c Robert B. Brandom.
250 ▼a First Edition.
264 1 ▼a Oxford, United Kingdom ; ▼a New York, NY, United States of America : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c 2022.
264 4 ▼c 짤2022
300 ▼a 1 online resource (139 pages).
336 ▼a text ▼b txt ▼2 rdacontent
337 ▼a computer ▼b c ▼2 rdamedia
338 ▼a online resource ▼b cr ▼2 rdacarrier
500 ▼a "The Spinoza lectures."
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
5050 ▼a Preface -- 1. Pragmatism as Completing the Enlightenment: Reason against Representation -- 2. Recognition and Recollection: The Social and Historical Dimensions of Reason -- Afterword -- References -- Index.
5203 ▼a During the last decade of his life, Rorty emphasized the anti-authoritarian credentials of his pragmatism. He came to see pragmatism as the fighting faith of a second phase of the Enlightenment. The first stage, as Rorty construed it, concerns our emancipation from nonhuman authority in practical matters: issues of what we ought to do and how things ought to be. The envisaged second stage addresses rather our emancipation from nonhuman authority in theoretical matters. Pragmatism moves beyond the traditional model of reality as authoritative over our cognitive representations of it in language and thought to a new conception of how discursive practices help us cope with the vicissitudes of life. Hegel anticipates the challenge to the very idea of objective reality as providing norms for thought that Rorty thought required us to enact a second phase of the Enlightenment. Unlike Rorty, Hegel presents a detailed, constructive, anti-authoritarian, nonfetishistic, social pragmatist account of the representational dimension of conceptual content. At its heart is an account of the social dimension of discursive normativity in terms of reciprocal recognition, and an account of the historicaldimension of discursive normativity in terms of a distinctive new conception of reason: the recollective rationality that turns a past into a tradition. His idealism thereby offers a concrete pragmatist alternative to Rorty's global semantic and epistemological anti-representationalism.
5880 ▼a Description based on online resource; title from home page (Oxford Academic, viewed November 13, 2023).
590 ▼a WorldCat record variable field(s) change: 050
60010 ▼a Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, ▼d 1770-1831.
60010 ▼a Rorty, Richard.
60017 ▼a Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, ▼d 1770-1831 ▼2 fast
60017 ▼a Rorty, Richard ▼2 fast
650 0 ▼a Representation (Philosophy)
650 0 ▼a Reality.
650 0 ▼a Idealism.
650 0 ▼a Pragmatism.
650 7 ▼a idealism (philosophical movement) ▼2 aat
650 7 ▼a pragmatism. ▼2 aat
650 7 ▼a Idealism ▼2 fast
650 7 ▼a Pragmatism ▼2 fast
650 7 ▼a Reality ▼2 fast
650 7 ▼a Representation (Philosophy) ▼2 fast
77608 ▼i Print version: ▼a Brandom, Robert B. ▼t Pragmatism and idealism. ▼d Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2022 ▼z 0192870211 ▼w (OCoLC)1336954055
85640 ▼3 EBSCOhost ▼u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=3424199
938 ▼a EBSCOhost ▼b EBSC ▼n 3424199
990 ▼a 관리자
994 ▼a 92 ▼b N$T