| LDR | | 05048cmm u2200601Ia 4500 |
| 001 | | 000000310893 |
| 003 | | OCoLC |
| 005 | | 20230525141121 |
| 006 | | m o d |
| 007 | | cr |n||||||||| |
| 008 | | 170518s2017 enk ob 000 0 eng d |
| 019 | |
▼a 987251197
▼a 987344118
▼a 987432804 |
| 020 | |
▼a 9781443892308
▼q (electronic bk.) |
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▼a 1443892300
▼q (electronic bk.) |
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▼z 1443898791 |
| 020 | |
▼z 9781443898799 |
| 029 | 1 |
▼a AU@
▼b 000060100679 |
| 035 | |
▼a (OCoLC)987738451
▼z (OCoLC)987251197
▼z (OCoLC)987344118
▼z (OCoLC)987432804 |
| 040 | |
▼a YDX
▼b eng
▼c YDX
▼d N$T
▼d EBLCP
▼d IDEBK
▼d MERUC
▼d N$T
▼d OCLCF
▼d OCLCQ
▼d 248032 |
| 049 | |
▼a MAIN |
| 050 | 4 |
▼a QA76.76.I58 |
| 072 | 7 |
▼a COM
▼x 000000
▼2 bisacsh |
| 082 | 04 |
▼a 006.3
▼2 23 |
| 100 | 1 |
▼a Gohar, Neelam,
▼e author. |
| 245 | 10 |
▼a Manipulative voting dynamics /
▼c by NeelamGohar. |
| 260 | |
▼a Newcastle upon Tyne :
▼b Cambridge Scholars Publishing,
▼c 2017. |
| 300 | |
▼a 1 online resource. |
| 336 | |
▼a text
▼b txt
▼2 rdacontent |
| 337 | |
▼a computer
▼b c
▼2 rdamedia |
| 338 | |
▼a online resource
▼b cr
▼2 rdacarrier |
| 504 | |
▼a Includes bibliographical references. |
| 505 | 0 |
▼a Abstract; Acknowledgments; List of Figures; Chapter One; 1.1 Background; 1.1.1 Manipulative Dynamics; 1.1.2 Tactical Voting Dynamics; 1.2 Related Work; 1.3 Problem Statement; 1.3.1 Contribution and Comparison with Previous Work; 1.3.2 Significance and Importance of the Problem; 1.3.3 Specific Research Questions; 1.4 Structure of Book; Chapter Two; 2.1 Notation and Assumptions; 2.2 Definitions; 2.2.1 Manipulations; 2.2.1.1 Types of Moves; 2.2.1.2 Types of Manipulations; 2.2.1.3 Weights Settings; 2.2.2 Existence of Potential Functions and Pure Nash Equilibria; 2.3 Summary |
| 505 | 8 |
▼a Chapter Three3.1 Tactical Voting; 3.1.1 Process Termination for Plurality Rule; 3.1.2 Process Termination for other Positional Scoring Rules; 3.1.2.1 Borda; 3.1.2.2 Veto and K-approval Voting Rule; 3.2 Weighted Votes; 3.2.1 The Plurality Rule; 3.2.2 Borda; 3.3 Conclusions; Chapter Four; 4.1 Increased Support Manipulative Dynamics with Weighted Votes; 4.1.1 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Increased Support for the Winning Candidate at Each State; 4.1.2 Upper Bound for General Weight Setting; 4.1.3 Bound for a Small Number of Voters |
| 505 | 8 |
▼a 4.1.3.1 Upper Bound for Bounded Real Weight Setting4.1.4 Upper Bound when the Smallest Weight is < 1; 4.1.5 An Upper Bound under Bounded Integer Weight Setting; 4.1.6 Efficient Process; 4.2 Other Voting Rules like Copeland; 4.2.1 Process Termination; 4.2.2 A Few Examples of Manipulative Dynamics with Copeland Voting Scheme; 4.3 Decreased Support Manipulative Dynamics; 4.3.1 How Long is the Sequence of Moves?; 4.4 Conclusions; Chapter Five; 5.1 Mixture of Different Moves; 5.2 Bounds in Terms of the Number of Distinct Weights; 5.2.1 Manipulation dynamics with un-weighted voters |
| 505 | 8 |
▼a 5.3 ConclusionsChapter Six; 6.1 Termination with a Tie-breaking Rule; 6.1.1 Veto Rule; 6.1.2 Borda Rule; 6.1.3 k-Ma jority Rule or k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.1.4 Copeland's Rule; 6.1.5 Bucklin Scheme; 6.1.6 Plurality with Run-off; 6.2 Process Termination when in Initial Settings, True and Declared Preferences of Voters are the same; 6.2.1 Borda Rule; 6.2.2 k-Approval Voting Rule; 6.2.3 Copeland's Rule; 6.2.4 Bucklin Scheme; 6.2.5 Veto Rule; 6.3 Conclusions; Chapter Seven; 7.1 Summary of Major Findings; 7.2 Implications of the Findings; 7.3 Suggestions for Further Research; Endnotes |
| 520 | |
▼a One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, including complexity analysis and algorithm design, in the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting. It seeks to import concepts from social choice theory into Artificial Intelligence and computing.People often have to reach a joint decision despite conflicting preferences over the. |
| 590 | |
▼a eBooks on EBSCOhost
▼b All EBSCO eBooks |
| 650 | 0 |
▼a Artificial intelligence. |
| 650 | 0 |
▼a Intelligent agents (Computer software) |
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▼a Voting. |
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▼a COMPUTERS / General
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▼a Artificial intelligence.
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▼0 (OCoLC)fst00817247 |
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▼a Intelligent agents (Computer software)
▼2 fast
▼0 (OCoLC)fst00975909 |
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▼a Voting.
▼2 fast
▼0 (OCoLC)fst01169232 |
| 655 | 4 |
▼a Electronic books. |
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▼a Electronic books. |
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▼c Original
▼z 1443898791
▼z 9781443898799
▼w (OCoLC)973905228 |
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▼u http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=1517769 |
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▼a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection
▼b IDEB
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▼a ProQuest MyiLibrary Digital eBook Collection
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▼a YBP Library Services
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▼a 관리자 |