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008141208s2015 nyu ob 001 0 eng d
019 ▼a 896794849 ▼a 909969903
020 ▼a 1317635205 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼a 9781317635208 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼z 9781138795969
020 ▼z 1138795968
020 ▼a 9781315758114
020 ▼a 1315758113
020 ▼z 1317635191
020 ▼z 9781317635192
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035 ▼a (OCoLC)897873890 ▼z (OCoLC)896794849 ▼z (OCoLC)909969903
037 ▼a 1864862 ▼b Proquest Ebook Central
040 ▼a CN3GA ▼b eng ▼e pn ▼c CN3GA ▼d OCLCO ▼d E7B ▼d YDXCP ▼d OCLCF ▼d EBLCP ▼d N$T ▼d TEF ▼d OCLCQ ▼d TYFRS ▼d YDX ▼d UAB ▼d OCLCO ▼d OCLCA ▼d 248032
049 ▼a MAIN
050 4 ▼a BD418.3 ▼b .G455 2015
072 7 ▼a PHI ▼x 010000 ▼2 bisacsh
08204 ▼a 128/.2 ▼2 23
1001 ▼a Georgalis, Nicholas, ▼d 1944-, ▼e author.
24510 ▼a Mind, language, and subjectivity : ▼b minimal content and the theory of thought / ▼c Nicholas Georgalis.
264 1 ▼a New York, NY : ▼b Routledge, ▼c 2015.
300 ▼a 1 online resource.
336 ▼a text ▼b txt ▼2 rdacontent
337 ▼a computer ▼b c ▼2 rdamedia
338 ▼a online resource ▼b cr ▼2 rdacarrier
4901 ▼a Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy ; ▼v 62
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
5050 ▼a Cover; Title; Copyright; Contents; Preface; 1 Minimal Content and Intentionality; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Privileged Access and Minimal Content; 1.3 Intentional States and Minimal Content; 1.4 Illustrative Applications of the Concepts; 1.5 Further Development of Some of the Fundamental Ideas Presented; 1.6 The Fundamental Intentional State; 2 More on Minimal Content and Related Issues; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Some General Remarks on Methodology; 2.3 So What, Then, Is Minimal Content?; 2.4 Yet Another Illustration of the Aptness of the Concept of Minimal Content; 2.5 Ontological Issues Set Aside.
5058 ▼a 2.6 Constituting and Grasping Minimal Content: Fregean, Cartesian, and Searlean Comparisons3 Thinking Differently About Thought and Language; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Standard Meaning and Standard Reference; 3.3 A New Theory of Thought; 3.4 The Fundamental Difference in the Current Theory From Alternatives; 4 The Superiority of the New Theory to Frege's; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Frege's Theory of Thought; 4.3 The Two Theories Compared; 4.4 The Object of Awareness; 4.5 The Perplexing Case of Dr. Lauben; 4.6 More Problems for Frege's Theory.
5058 ▼a 4.7 Failure of Frege's Stipulation Strategy and a Fundamental Problem for the Concept of Sense: Standard Meaning Prevails4.8 More on Different Language and Different Thought Problems; 4.9 Troubles for Frege's Discussion of 'I'; 4.10 Concluding Contrasts and Summary of the New Theory; 5 Kripke's Puzzle About Belief Solved; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Contrasting the Orthodox View of Belief with the New Theory; 5.3 Paderewski Puzzle; 5.4 'London'/'Londres' Puzzle; 5.5 Summary; 6 Use, Idiolect, and Statement Made; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Use and Idiolects; 6.3 Statement Made; 7 Speaker's Referent.
5058 ▼a 7.1 Introduction7.2 A Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent; 7.3 Kripke's Distinction: Speaker's Reference/Semantic Reference; 7.4 Residual Difficulty for the Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent Resolved; 8 Speaker's Referent and the Referential/Attributive Distinction; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 The Phenomenon at Issue in Alleged Referential Uses; 8.3 The Subjective Theory of Speaker's Referent Applied to the Phenomenon; 8.4 Critique of Referential/Attributive Use of Definite Descriptions; 8.5 The Circle of "Referential Use" and Statement Made; 9 Proper Names; 9.1 Introduction.
5058 ▼a 9.2 Searle's 1958 Theory of Proper Names9.3 Did Kripke Refute Searle's Theory of Proper Names?; 9.4 Proper Names and Possible Worlds; 9.5 The New Theory Provides a Corrective to a Remaining Problem; 9.6 Brief Summary; 10 Solutions to Classic Problems; 10.1 Introduction; 10.2 Substitution in Propositional Attitudes; 10.3 Frege's Puzzle; 10.4 More on Substitution and Transparent/Opaque Reading; 10.5 Two Remaining Puzzles: True Negative Existentials and Empty Names; 10.6 Brief Summary; 11 Securing Determinate Meaning-Part I: Against Kripkenstein; 11.1 Introduction.
520 ▼a In this monograph Nicholas Georgalis further develops his important work on minimal content, recasting and providing novel solutions to several of the fundamental problems faced by philosophers of language. His theory defends and explicates the importance of 'thought-tokens' and minimal content and their many-to-one relation to linguistic meaning, challenging both 'externalist' accounts of thought and the solutions to philosophical problems of language they inspire. The concepts of idiolect, use, and statement made are critically discussed, and a classification of kinds of utterances is develo.
5880 ▼a Print version record.
590 ▼a eBooks on EBSCOhost ▼b All EBSCO eBooks
650 0 ▼a Philosophy of mind.
650 0 ▼a Language and languages ▼x Philosophy.
650 0 ▼a Subject (Philosophy)
650 7 ▼a PHILOSOPHY ▼x Movements ▼x Humanism. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a Language and languages ▼x Philosophy. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00992193
650 7 ▼a Philosophy of mind. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01060840
650 7 ▼a Subject (Philosophy) ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01136447
650 7 ▼a Philosophy of Mind ▼2 gnd
650 7 ▼a Sprachphilosophie ▼2 gnd
650 7 ▼a Subjekt ▼g Philosophie ▼2 gnd
655 4 ▼a Electronic books.
655 7 ▼a Electronic books. ▼2 lcsh
77608 ▼i Print version: ▼a Georgalis, Nicholas, 1944- ▼t Mind, language, and subjectivity. ▼z 9781138795969 ▼z 1138795968 ▼w (DLC) 2014018149
830 0 ▼a Routledge studies in contemporary philosophy ; ▼v 62.
85640 ▼u http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&AN=909645
938 ▼a Taylor & Francis ▼b TAFR ▼n 9781315758114
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990 ▼a 관리자