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LDR04196cmm uu200589Ka 4500
001000000301865
003OCoLC
00520230519144014
006m o d
007cr cnu---unuuu
008120509s2012 nju ob 001 0 eng d
010 ▼z 2012000421
019 ▼a 794493872 ▼a 817078187
020 ▼a 9781400842308 (electronic bk.)
020 ▼a 1400842301 (electronic bk.)
020 ▼z 9780691154725 (hardcover : alk. paper)
020 ▼z 0691154724 (hardcover : alk. paper)
0291 ▼a AU@ ▼b 000049998751
035 ▼a (OCoLC)793359627
037 ▼a 22573/cttmhcc ▼b JSTOR
040 ▼a N$T ▼c N$T ▼d E7B ▼d YDXCP ▼d CDX ▼d OCLCQ ▼d IDEBK ▼d OCLCQ ▼d MHW ▼d IAI ▼d JSTOR ▼d OCLCF ▼d 248032
049 ▼a K4RA
050 4 ▼a BD215 ▼b .F587 2012eb
072 7 ▼a PHI ▼x 004000 ▼2 bisacsh
072 7 ▼a HPK ▼2 bicssc
072 7 ▼a PHI004000 ▼2 bisacsh
08204 ▼a 121 ▼2 23
1001 ▼a Foley, Richard, ▼d 1947-
24510 ▼a When is true belief knowledge? ▼h [electronic resource] / ▼c Richard Foley.
260 ▼a Princeton : ▼b Princeton University Press, ▼c c2012.
300 ▼a 1 online resource (viii, 153 p.)
4901 ▼a Princeton monographs in philosophy
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references (p. [137]-148) and index.
5050 ▼a An observation -- Post-gettier accounts of knowledge -- Knowledge stories -- Intuitions about knowledge -- Important truths -- Maximally accurate and comprehensive beliefs -- The beetle in the box -- Knowledge blocks -- The theory of knowledge and theory of justified belief -- The value of true belief -- The value of knowledge -- The lottery and preface -- Reverse lottery stories -- Lucky knowledge -- Closure and skepticism -- Disjunctions -- Fixedness and knowledge -- Instability and knowledge -- Misleading defeaters -- Believing that I don't know -- Introspective knowledge -- Perceptual knowledge -- A priori knowledge -- Collective knowledge -- A look back -- Epistemology within a general theory of rationality -- The core concepts of epistemology.
520 ▼a A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information.
588 ▼a Description based on print version record.
650 0 ▼a Knowledge, Theory of.
650 0 ▼a Belief and doubt.
650 7 ▼a PHILOSOPHY / Epistemology. ▼2 bisacsh
650 7 ▼a Belief and doubt. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00830124
650 7 ▼a Knowledge, Theory of. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00988194
655 4 ▼a Electronic books.
77608 ▼i Print version: ▼a Foley, Richard, 1947- ▼t When is true belief knowledge? ▼d Princeton : Princeton University Press, c2012 ▼z 9780691154725 ▼w (DLC) 2012000421 ▼w (OCoLC)761850802
830 0 ▼a Princeton monographs in philosophy.
85640 ▼3 EBSCOhost ▼u http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=444127
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938 ▼a EBSCOhost ▼b EBSC ▼n 444127
938 ▼a Ingram Digital eBook Collection ▼b IDEB ▼n 358930
990 ▼a 관리자
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