자료유형 | E-Book |
---|---|
개인저자 | Liao, Xiaoye. |
단체저자명 | New York University. Economics. |
서명/저자사항 | Essays in Information Design. |
발행사항 | [S.l.] : New York University., 2018 |
발행사항 | Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 |
형태사항 | 182 p. |
소장본 주기 | School code: 0146. |
ISBN | 9780438171077 |
일반주기 |
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12(E), Section: A.
Adviser: Ennio Stacchetti. |
요약 | Information design, or Bayesian persuasion, is one way to model and analyze the act of exploiting an informational advantage to affect others' decisions, and is also used to facilitate robust predictions of games with incomplete information. The |
요약 | In Chapter 1, I develop a theory on how the receiver's incentive to optimize information acquisition will affect the optimal provision of information. Specifically, I consider information design in a dynamic model where, unlike in standard Bayes |
요약 | In Chapter 2, I look at an economic design problem combining dynamic Bayesian persuasion and money transfers, which is also an application of information design in stress test. To be concrete, I study the problem of a government dynamically deci |
일반주제명 | Economic theory. Economics. |
언어 | 영어 |
기본자료 저록 | Dissertation Abstracts International79-12A(E). Dissertation Abstract International |
대출바로가기 | http://www.riss.kr/pdu/ddodLink.do?id=T14997105 |
인쇄
No. | 등록번호 | 청구기호 | 소장처 | 도서상태 | 반납예정일 | 예약 | 서비스 | 매체정보 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | WE00027910 | 330 | 가야대학교/전자책서버(컴퓨터서버)/ | 대출가능 |