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LDR04065cmm u22005538i 4500
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003OCoLC
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008200428s2020 nyu ob 001 0 eng
010 ▼a 2020007760
020 ▼a 0190260726
020 ▼a 9780190260729 ▼q (electronic bk.)
020 ▼z 9780190260705 ▼q (hardback)
035 ▼a 2601234 ▼b (N$T)
035 ▼a (OCoLC)1153336553
040 ▼a DLC ▼b eng ▼e rda ▼c DLC ▼d OCLCO ▼d OCLCF ▼d N$T ▼d 248032
042 ▼a pcc
049 ▼a MAIN
05000 ▼a HG1601
08200 ▼a 332.1 ▼2 23
1001 ▼a Wilmarth, Arthur E., ▼d 1951-, ▼e author.
24510 ▼a Taming the megabanks : ▼b why we we need a new Glass-Steagall Act to break up financial giants and prevent another systemic crisis / ▼c Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. ▼h [electronic resource]
260 ▼a New York : ▼b Oxford University Press, ▼c 2020.
263 ▼a 2009
300 ▼a 1 online resource
336 ▼a text ▼b txt ▼2 rdacontent
337 ▼a computer ▼b n ▼2 rdamedia
338 ▼a online resource ▼b nc ▼2 rdacarrier
504 ▼a Includes bibliographical references and index.
520 ▼a "This book uses a chronological and narrative approach and draws on a wide range of sources. It demonstrates that universal banks - which accept deposits, make loans, and engage in securities activities - played central roles in precipitating the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007-09. Universal banks promoted a dangerous credit boom and speculative stock market bubble in the U.S. during the 1920s, which led to the Great Depression. Congress responded by passing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which separated banks from the securities markets and prohibited nonbanks from accepting deposits. Glass-Steagall's structural barriers prevented financial panics from spreading across the banking, securities, and insurance sectors for more than four decades. Regulators could address problems arising in one financial sector without needing to bail out the entire financial system. Large U.S. banks pursued a twenty-year campaign to remove Glass-Steagall's barriers. Regulators opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall during the 1980s and 1990s, and Congress repealed Glass-Steagall in 1999. The United Kingdom and the European Union adopted similar deregulatory measures. Large U.S. securities firms became "shadow banks" as regulators allowed them to issue short-term deposit substitutes to finance long-term loans and investments. Universal banks and shadow banks fueled a toxic subprime credit boom on both sides of the Atlantic during the 2000s, which led to the Great Recession. The limited reforms that followed the Great Recession did not break up universal banks and shadow banks. Those reforms left in place a financial system that is prone to excessive risk-taking and vulnerable to contagious panics. A new Glass-Steagall Act is urgently needed to prevent another systemic crisis and restore a more stable and resilient financial system"-- ▼c Provided by publisher.
588 ▼a Description based on print version record and CIP data provided by publisher; resource not viewed.
590 ▼a Added to collection customer.56279.3
650 0 ▼a Universal banks.
650 0 ▼a Banks and banking, International.
650 0 ▼a Banking law.
650 0 ▼a Securities.
650 0 ▼a Organizational change.
650 7 ▼a Banking law. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00826811
650 7 ▼a Banks and banking, International. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst00827100
650 7 ▼a Organizational change. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01047828
650 7 ▼a Securities. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01110743
650 7 ▼a Universal banks. ▼2 fast ▼0 (OCoLC)fst01161552
655 4 ▼a Electronic books.
77608 ▼i Print version: ▼a Wilmarth, Arthur E., 1951- ▼t Taming the megabanks ▼d New York : Oxford University Press, 2020. ▼z 9780190260705 ▼w (DLC) 2020007759
85640 ▼3 EBSCOhost ▼u https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&scope=site&db=nlebk&db=nlabk&AN=2601234
938 ▼a EBSCOhost ▼b EBSC ▼n 2601234
990 ▼a 관리자
994 ▼a 92 ▼b N$T